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INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal preemption of state law is often considered to come at the cost 
of Federalism values. Where some national interest is deemed important 
enough, policymakers and scholars reason that state law and Federalism 
principles like local democratic control or localized policy innovation must 
give way to that overriding federal interest.1 However, the federal judiciary 
and Congress are also sensitive to the dramatic consequences of preemption 
of state law, and this sensitivity has led to numerous carve-outs in federal 
legislation2 as well as a canon of clear statement rules and presumptions 
against preemption3 recognized in order to protect Federalism values.  
Section 1044 of the 2011 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act4 is a creature of this historical suspicion of federal 
preemption. It purports to weaken the powers of federal regulators to preempt 
state law affecting national banks in an attempt to improve the rigor of 
financial regulation in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, especially with 
respect to consumer debt origination. While some have argued that Section 
1044 plays an important role in protecting state consumer finance protection 
 
1 See generally Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 208, 81 Stat. 485, 501 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543) (preempting state motor vehicle emissions and 
fuel standards where less stringent than the federal standard so as to benefit the environment); 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514(a), 88 Stat. 
829, 897 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)) (establishing field preemption over 
“any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan” so as to create a uniform set of rules for retirement plans nationwide); Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (current version at 11 U.S.C.) (using federal 
preemption to establish a uniform bankruptcy court system for the entire country, which, 
unlike other instances of broad preemption commands, stems from the Constitution’s text 
itself per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . establish . . . 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”)). 
2 See e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (defining “qualified domestic relations order”); I.R.C. 
§ 414(p)(1)(A) (establishing qualified domestic relations orders as not preempted by 
ERISA’s anti-assignment provisions); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(e)(2) (establishing special 
exemptions for California in light of its history of aggressive environmental protection 
through strict fuel and emissions standards). 
3 See e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“Congress legislated 
here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”) (citations omitted); Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985) (“We also must presume that Congress 
did not intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation.”) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992) 
(“[W]e must construe these provisions in light of the presumption against the pre-emption of 
state police power regulations.”). 
4 12 U.S.C. § 25b. 
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laws from wanton federal preemption, in reality Section 1044 upsets the 
careful balance of state and federal interests within our Dual Banking system, 
in which state and nationally chartered banks compete within their own 
distinct regulatory environments. 
The Federalism problems inherent to Section 1044 stem from its 
deviations from our Dual Banking system—a system that inverts many of our 
traditional assumptions about the supposed antagonism between preemption 
and Federalism values. Instead of inherently threatening state interests, 
federal preemption within the realm of Dual Banking maintains our distinct 
federal and state banking regimes, as well as the Federalism values that Dual 
Banking serves. 
Viewed from this perspective, Section 1044 represents an unwise, 
perhaps even reactionary turn towards the supremacy of state bank regulators 
reminiscent of early constitutional disputes which led to cases like McCulloch 
v. Maryland.5 This historical legacy is a far cry from the progressive 
aspirations of Dodd-Frank as a whole, which speaks to the wandering 
development of American banking law and the troubling implications of 
Section 1044. From the very structure of our banking system, which has often 
been described as “balkanized,”6 to shifting policy preferences expressed by 
Congress,7 the principles that undergird our federal banking regime often 
seem to be anything but consistent or logical.  
 
5 See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317–19 (1819) (detailing Maryland’s attempt to tax a federal 
bank, which the Court ultimately found unconstitutional). 
6 See e.g., Louise Bennetts, Regulatory Fragmentation, the Balkanization of Financial 
Markets and the Competitiveness of the American Financial Services Sector, CATO INST., 
(Mar. 4, 2014), https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/regulatory-fragmentation-bal 
kanization-financial-markets-competitiveness [https://perma.cc/GBV6-U6VE] (discussing 
“[t]he Costs of Regulatory Fragmentation within the United States” and “The Dangers of 
Financial Sector ‘Balkanization’”); Jana Kasperkevic, Does the U.S. Have Too Many 
Financial Regulators?, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/ 2018/ 
03/19/what-balkanization-fragmented-financial-regulatory-system/ [https://perma.cc/G98V-
6SYD] (“This ‘relative balkanization of the authorities was a major factor in why this crisis 
was so bad and why the damage to the economy was so great,’ said Timothy Geithner, who 
was the president of the New York Fed when the financial crisis began, and who later became 
President Obama’s first Treasury secretary.”); Carter H. Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking 
System, 53 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (1967) (identifying the challenge “jurisdictional 
conflicts” pose to both banks and regulators). 
7 See e.g., Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (reversing 
the long-held trend of prohibiting interstate bank branching, a policy that befuddles modern 
banking experts); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (expanding the 
power of thrifts to engage in general banking after the failure of thrifts during the savings 
and loans crisis); Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 1, 38 Stat. 251, 251 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 221) (establishing a mixed private-public hybrid 
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 History suggests that this fragmented structure is the consequence of 
the patchwork nature of federal banking legislation. Whereas most of the rest 
of the world has opted for a unified structure for banking regulation with one 
agency in charge,8 the United States relies on a number of agencies, 
established primarily through individual organic statutes, to implement 
cohesive financial policy by consensus.9 This picture is complicated by the 
fact that banking and financial regulation is also a state affair. Each state has 
its own unique system of bank chartering, regulation, and supervision which 
may or may not resemble the federal scheme.10 This Dual Banking system11 
is a unique part of “our Federalism,”12 and it is threatened by Section 1044. 
 By hampering the ability of federal regulators to preempt state law 
affecting the operation of national banks, Section 1044 allows state regulators 
to break down the Dual Banking system by enforcing state banking policy on 
national banks, and, to a lesser extent, on banks chartered by other states. In 
the process, Section 1044 threatens to deprive us of Federalism benefits 
secured by our Dual Banking system such as policy innovation, democratic 
 
structure for the Federal Reserve System). For the contradictory and confused reasoning that 
motivated the structure of the federal reserve, see generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE 
POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 23–24, 103–26 (2016). 
8 Kasperkevic, supra note 6 (“‘I don’t know of another major country that has anything close 
to it,’ Scott said. ‘For instance, to take England by comparison, they have a bank regulator and 
one market regulator. That’s it. Japan, they have actually a single regulator of everything.’”). 
9 E.g., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Reserve, the Treasury 
Department, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
10 See State-Chartered Banks by State, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.csbs.org/state-chartered-banks-state [https://perma.cc/ZZ7J-97U8] (suggesting 
that some states may offer thrift or credit union charters in addition to bank charters, some may 
offer only bank charters, some may centralize bank supervision in one entity or not, et cetera). 
11 For an explanation of the Dual Banking system, see generally Julia Stackhouse, Why 
America's Dual Banking System Matters, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, Sept. 19, 2017, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2017/september/americas-dual-banking-system-
matters [https://perma.cc/UG9F-6BSB]. 
12 One of the more timeless explanations of “Our Federalism” can be found in Justice Black’s 
opinion in Younger v. Harris, which stresses that Federalism is more than just a state affair:  
“Our Federalism” . . . does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights” 
any more than it means centralization of control over every important 
issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected 
both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which 
there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National 
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it 
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, 
always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States. 
401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
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accountability, and political transparency.13 However, the anti-federal 
instincts behind Section 1044 are hardly a recent development, and in fact 
date back to the early Republic. The classic example of skepticism toward 
national banking is President Andrew Jackson’s message to the Senate upon 
his veto of the bill that would have re-chartered the Second Bank of the 
United States in July of 1832.14 Putting aside his arguments that the bank was 
blatantly unconstitutional, Jackson specifically argued that the bank was 
controlled by and primarily benefited foreigners and foreign governments, that 
it favored Eastern states over Western states, and that it was otherwise corrupt 
and mismanaged.15 None of these criticisms made much sense on the merits, 
especially given that Jackson’s veto left bank chartering entirely up to the 
states, who were no less likely to have foreign investors, and did not have a 
reputation for good management or clean books.16 Jackson’s veto was in fact 
a manifestation of his distrust of federal banking institutions, a reactionary 
turn against national “monied interests” and towards state institutions.17 
 A parallel can be drawn between Jackson’s sentiments and those 
which motivated the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act18 in 2010. While Dodd-Frank has experienced 
intense scrutiny from conservative figures, some of whom have argued that 
it is unconstitutional,19 some of its provisions are startlingly conservative by 
objective standards. It is not immediately clear how ending bailouts would 
serve the goals of financial stability or aggressive, sound federal banking 
regulation.20 Similarly, it is unclear how Dodd-Frank’s curtailment of federal 
 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 8 REG. DEB. app. 73–79 (1832). 
15 Id. at 74–75. 
16 The period which followed Jackson’s veto is fondly referred to as the years of “Wild Cat 
Banking,” in which fraud seemed to be part and parcel of operating a state-chartered bank. 
Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and Shinplasters, 
FED. RSRV. BANK MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Fall 1982, at 10, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
research/qr/qr632.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW6X-6SCY]. 
17 8 REG. DEB. app. 79 (1832). 
18 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended primarily in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). The long form name of the Act is revealing: “An Act to promote 
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending 
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.” Id. at 1376. 
19 See e.g., C. Boyden Gray & Jim R. Purcell, Opinion, Why Dodd-Frank is Unconstitutional, 
WALL ST. J. (Jun. 21, 2012, 6:41 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527 
02304765304577480451892603234 [https://perma.cc/AHF4-H877] (arguing that the structure 
of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau violates constitutional separation of powers).  
20 Indeed, much of the rest of the world regards bailouts as routine crisis measures. Luke 
Frazza, The List: The World’s Biggest Bailouts, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 15, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
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banking preemption authority under Section 1044 benefits the cause of sound 
banking regulation and consumer protection. Much like Jackson’s veto, 
Section 1044 represents an unwarranted policy preference for state regulators 
and against their federal counterparts. In deviating from the Dual Banking 
system generally, Dodd-Frank’s preemption provisions actually deprive our 
banking system of many of the benefits that follow from Federalist principles. 
 The narrative which contributed to the passage of Section 1044,21 that 
federal regulators were asleep at the wheel in 2008 and that excessive federal 
preemption hamstrung state regulators that could have otherwise prevented 
or lessened the impact of the 2008 financial crisis, is likely wrong for many of 
the same reasons that Jackson’s faith in state-dominated banking was wrong.22 
But more importantly, Dodd-Frank’s curtailment of federal banking 
preemption authority undermines Federalism principles and in doing so defeats 
the goal of an efficient, coherent, and state-inclusive banking scheme.23  
This paper argues that regardless of how much or what kind of 
financial regulation is optimal, it should be enacted within the confines of our 
Dual Banking system consistent with the principles that motivate our 
Federalism. Part I details the practice and precedent of our Dual Banking 
system as a part of our Federalism. Part II provides a recent history of federal 
banking law and its departures from our Dual Banking system. Part III argues 
that Federalism values would be better served by liberal federal preemption 
standards for state laws affecting nationally chartered banks. Part IV argues that 
Section 1044’s Skidmore instructions also threaten Federalism interests. This 
 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2008/09/15/the-list-the-worlds-biggest-bailouts [https://perma.cc/ 
2FBP-DA27]. There may be an intuitive progressive flair to the goal of “ending bailouts,” 
but there is also a laissez-faire dimension to the project, which betrays a hostility to 
government intervention. See e.g., Steve Chapman, The Case Against the Bailout, REASON 
(Sept. 25, 2008, 7:00 AM), https://reason.com/2008/09/25/the-case-against-the-bailout 
[https://perma.cc/Q3XX-H5KN] (“Not only that, the more effective it is, the more damage 
it will do to the free market system. Saving companies from their bad gambles turns business 
into a game of ‘profits for me, losses for you,’ corroding the incentives that make capitalism 
so innovative and efficient.”). 
21 See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the 
Dodd-Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2011) (“Bar-
Gill and Warren also alleged that the aggressive preemption of state consumer financial 
protection laws by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘OCC’) in the 2000s 
weakened consumer financial protection at the state level.”). 
22 See generally Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer 
Financial Protection: Past and Future, 31 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 25, 34 (2012) 
(questioning whether consumer finance protection laws have any impact on financial stability). 
23 Ultimately, this paper tries to be agnostic on the question of whether consumer finance 
protection laws would or would not have prevented or lessened the impact of the 2008 financial 
crisis. It is an irrelevant question, as consumer finance protection laws can be passed at the 
federal level for national banks as well, consistent with our Dual Banking system. 
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article concludes with an endorsement of improving federal regulation instead 
of curtailing federal preemption in the area of consumer financial protection. 
 
 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 
 
While our Dual Banking system has not been a part of American 
government for as many years as our Constitution has, it is nonetheless an 
important part of our Federalist traditions. Indeed, many parts of the Dual 
Banking system take on constitutional significance when expressed in federal 
legislative commands under the Supremacy Clause, most commonly in order 
to achieve parity between state and national banks in terms of their authorized 
powers. This drive for competitive parity not only has a long history in the 
Federal Congress and Judiciary,24 but also in a national consensus which 
includes state legislatures.25 
 
A. Federal Legislative and Judicial Recognition 
 
Our Dual Banking system has been an integral aspect of American 
banking since the passage of the National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864 
(collectively, “National Bank Act”). Passed in the middle of the Civil War by 
Radical Republicans, the National Bank Act was designed to establish a 
national currency, raise war money, and establish nationally chartered 
banks.26 Prior to the National Bank Act, bank chartering was essentially an 
enterprise left to the states, much as corporate chartering is left to the states 
today, at least for now.27 Potential applicants interested in opening a bank had 
to apply to a state office in order to obtain a charter, and the state which 
chartered that bank was responsible for its regulation, much in the same way that 
 
24 See infra Section I.A. 
25 See infra Section I.B. 
26 See generally Kevin Dowd, "US Banking in the 'Free Banking' Period," in THE 
EXPERIENCE OF FREE BANKING (Kevin Dowd ed., 1992) (summarizing the state of banking 
immediately before the first and second National Banking Act (“NBA”)); Richard 
Grossman, US Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert 
Whaples, ed., 2008), https://eh.net/encyclopedia/us-banking-history-civil-war-to-world-war-
ii/ [https://perma.cc/S3H3-T2GW] (discussing the purposes behind the NBA, which were to 
establish a national currency, raise war money and basically obliterate state charters). 
27 Senator Warren has a plan to introduce mandatory federal charters for certain large U.S. 
corporations which would limit their ability to engage in political activities and mandate 
worker representation on corporate boards, among other things which surely would offend 
the Delaware bar. Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth Warren Has a Plan to Save Capitalism, VOX 
(Aug. 15, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17683022/elizabeth-warren-
accountable-capitalism-corporations [https://perma.cc/SY8J-JGAL].  
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the internal affairs doctrine excludes foreign states from regulating the internal 
governance of a foreign corporation chartered by any other state today.28 
After the passage of the National Bank Act, state-chartered banks or 
prospective bank managers had the option to apply for national charters that 
would subject them to federal regulation and supervision instead of state 
oversight.29 Importantly, the Civil War Congresses actually expressed a 
preference for national bank charters over state charters, limiting the 
authority of states to tax nationally chartered banks in 1864,30 while 
establishing a 10% tax on state bank notes, eliminating all state bank currency, 
and generally encouraging state banks to acquire national charters in 1865.31 
This preference for national charters would not last into the 20th Century. 
 From the postbellum period onwards, federal policy regarding state 
charters softened, moving towards the goal of parity between state and federal 
bank charters in order to allow equal competition between nationally and 
state-chartered banks.32 This shift accelerated in the 20th Century. In 1927, 
Congress passed the McFadden Act, specifically allowing nationally 
chartered banks to branch within a state to the extent state-chartered banks in 
that state could in order to achieve exact precision between national and state 
banks within each state.33 This measure was enacted in reaction to the rise in 
 
28 See generally McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987) (applying the internal 
affairs doctrine). 
29 For information on the distinction between regulation and supervision, see Banking 
Supervision, FED. RSRV. EDUC. https://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/ 
structure-and-functions/banking-supervision [https://perma.cc/S6N4-PHX6] (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2020). State-chartered banks retain the power to switch to a national charter today, 
and vice versa for nationally chartered banks. See, e.g., Dan Ennis, OCC Signs Off on Fifth 
Third's Switch to National Bank, BANKING DIVE (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.banking 
dive.com/news/fifth-third-occ-national-bank-charter/562741 [https://perma.cc/WN2V-XLHY] 
(detailing the OCC’s approval of a Cincinnati-based bank’s application for a national charter). 
30 Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. 111, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 548) 
(limiting state taxation of nationally chartered banks); see also Samuel B. Chase, Jr., State 
Taxation of Banks, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 149, 150 (1967) (noting that courts have 
upheld federal power to determine a state’s ability to tax national banks). 
31 FED. RSRV. BANK OF PHILA., THE STATE AND NATIONAL BANKING ERAS: A CHAPTER IN 
THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKING 12 (2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/8115/ 
20190122150741/https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/publications/economic-education/ 
state-and-national-banking-eras.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/YEA4-URFS]. 
32 Compare Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual 
Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681–83 (1988) (detailing the Congressional 
desire to eliminate Dual Banking during the civil war), with E. A. GOLDENWEISER, IRA 
CLERK, M. J. FLEMING, L. R. ROUNDS, E. L. SMEAD, FED. RSRV. COMMITTEE ON BRANCH, 
GROUP, AND CHAIN BANKING, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1–16 
(1930),  (discussing the transition from the Civil War Period to the early 20th Century, during 
which a “form of rivalry which has been described as a competition in laxity” emerged in 
the Dual Banking system). 
33 Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228–29. 
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expanded intrastate chartering authority of state banks. For most of American 
history, banks were limited to one location. In interpreting the McFadden Act, 
the Supreme Court itself noted the “competitive equality” that Congress seeks 
to establish between state and nationally chartered banks, especially given the 
“competitive tensions inherent in a dual banking structure where state and 
national banks coexist.”34 
Later, when some states began to allow interstate branching, the 
Federal government acted again to restore parity to the Dual Banking system 
by passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 
of 1994.35 Again, Riegle-Neal respected parity within each state by only 
granting the power to branch between states to national banks chartered in 
those states in which state banks also had this authority.36 
Another example of the importance that Congress places on parity is 
deposit insurance, which today covers consumer bank deposits for all banks, 
state and national, as of 1950. The Original Banking Act of 1933 did not 
mandate that state-chartered banks acquire deposit insurance from the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Company, but this was remedied with the Federal 
Deposit Act of 1950.37 More recently, in 1991, Section 24 of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Improvement Act was passed to limit 
the corporate powers of state-chartered, FDIC insured banks to those given 
to nationally chartered banks.38 Collectively, these examples suggest that 
Congress has endorsed parity within our Dual Banking system by limiting or 
expanding the power of national or state-chartered banks to ensure that one 
would not overwhelm the other. 
 
B. A National Consensus 
 
 
34 First Nat’l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 131 (1969); see also id. at 133 (“The policy 
of competitive quality is therefore firmly embedded in the statutes governing the national 
banking system.”). 
35 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
36 See 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (“A national banking association may, with the approval of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of 
the city, town or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and 
operation are at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in 
question”) (emphasis added); 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(4)(A) (“An interstate merger transaction 
may involve the acquisition of a branch of an insured bank without the acquisition of the 
bank only if the law of the State in which the branch is located permits out-of-State banks to 
acquire a branch of a bank in such State without acquiring the bank.”) (emphasis added). 
37 See Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 5  (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1)) (extending deposit insurance to almost all depository institutions, 
state and national). 
38 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 
§303(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2349–53 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831(a)). 
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This respect, and at times, demand for parity between national and 
state banks has not been pursued by the federal government alone. Similarly, 
state legislatures have acted through “wild card statutes,” which in effect 
“grant[] state-chartered banks the power to engage in any activities permitted 
for national banks.”39 The structure of these statutes varies immensely from 
state to state, but regardless of their form they serve as a sign that the 
federalist interests promoted by a competitive Dual Banking system are 
favored both by the national and state governments.40 In fact, their “near-
unanimous adoption” by state legislatures suggests that there is a national 
consensus on the issue.41 
In instances in which state governments have tried to directly impede 
the powers of nationally chartered banks rather than establishing competitive 
parity, in effect breaking the rules of our Dual Banking system, the Supreme 
Court has ruled in favor of preemption. In Barnett Bank v. Nelson, the court 
held that any state laws which “significantly interfere with the national bank's 
exercise of its powers” are preempted by the original National Bank Act of 
1863.42 In this case, Florida had made it illegal for banks of any kind to sell 
insurance, a power which national legislation had granted to all nationally 
chartered banks.43 The Supreme Court ruled that because the state law was in 
clear conflict with the federal law authorizing the sale of insurance by 
national banks, it was preempted.44 The Barnett preemption standard has 
since been interpreted to “hold a wide variety of state laws preempted.”45 This 
is not to say that the Supreme Court was ratifying a national policy of hostility 
to state banking preferences. Instead, it was confirming the power of the 
federal government to determine the powers of its own banks, just as states 
generally have over their own chartered institutions. This in effect forced 
states to turn to the federal legislative process in order to limit the terms on 
 
39 JAY B. SYKES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45081, BANKING LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION IN THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 8 (2018). 
40 John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of 
Regulatory Practice, Constitutional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 
197, 202–08 (2003). 
41 Id. at 200. 
42 Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). 
43 Id. at 28–29 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 92 and FLA. STAT. § 626.988 (Supp. 1996) (repealed by 
Laws 1999, c. 99-388, § 8, eff. July 1, 1999)). 
44 See id. at 34 (“The Federal Statute before us, as in Franklin Nat. Bank, explicitly grants a 
national bank an authorization, permission, or power.”). Interestingly, the court found that 
the McCarran–Ferguson Act’s special state insurance law pre-emption standard under 15 
U.S.C. § 1012(b) did not apply because the federal law authorizing national banks to sell 
insurance specifically related to the business of insurance. Id. at 38. This provision of the act 
bears a functional similarity to Dodd-Frank’s OCC pre-emption standard under Section 1044. 
45 SYKES, supra note 39, at “Summary.” 
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which national bank charters could compete, consistent with our Dual 
Banking system.  
 
 
 
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DUAL BANKING 
 
This system of parity under Dual Banking continued until 2004, 
according to proponents of Section 1044, when the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (“OCC”) published a final rule on preemption “clarifying the 
applicability of state law to national banks.”46 This OCC rulemaking, they 
argued, expanded the scope of federal preemption of state banking laws to 
“create large holes in the regulatory fabric that encourage[d] lenders to use a 
national charter to evade local protection.”47 These OCC rules48 were directly 
responded to in Dodd-Frank in the form of Section 1044,49 which curtails the 
preemption of state banking laws affecting nationally chartered banks.  
 
A. The 2004 OCC Rules 
  
The crucial language in the 2004 OCC Rules clarified that state laws 
are preempted if they “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s 
exercise of its lending, deposit-taking, or other powers granted to it under 
Federal law.”50 This left state laws in force over national banks only to the 
extent that they had an “incidental” effect on “a national bank’s exercise of 
its lending, deposit-taking, or other powers granted to it under Federal law.”51 
Critics alleged that this standard for preemption was akin to a kind of field-
preemption52 which largely eviscerated, inter alia, state consumer lending 
laws.53 Senator Elizabeth Warren, one of the chief architects of Dodd-Frank, 
 
46 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2004-6, PREEMPTION 
AND VISITORIAL POWERS: TWO FINAL RULES (2004). 
47 Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2008). 
48 See infra Section II.A. 
49 See infra Section II.B. 
50 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34). 
51 Id. at 1911–12. 
52 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (“[T]he States are precluded from 
regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined 
must be regulated by its exclusive governance.”) (emphasis added) (discussing field 
preemption as a form of preemption in which all state law governing an area is preempted 
by federal law according to Congress’s wishes). 
53 See generally Wook Bai Kim, Challenging the Roots of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: 
The OCC's Operating Subsidiaries Regulations and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 21 LOY. 
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and later a favored candidate for the first official director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), was an early critic of this preemption 
standard. In 2008 she suggested that the preemption standard enshrined in the 
2004 rules was so broad that it could arguably render nationally chartered 
banks “free to flaunt all state laws.”54 
 The OCC maintained that its new preemption rule was only intended 
to “distill” the various preemption doctrines established by the Supreme 
Court under the National Bank Act, not to expand upon them.55 It also 
explicitly identified areas of state law that it did not believe the National Bank 
Act generally preempted for national banks, including “contracts, collection 
of debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, zoning, crimes, torts, 
and homestead rights.”56 
 Irrespective of the exact scope of the 2004 OCC rules, it is clear that 
a great deal of state consumer finance protection laws were covered, and 
critics allege that the sort of predatory loans which caused the 2008 financial 
crisis would have been offered less frequently if the 2004 OCC rules had not 
been promulgated.57 The extent to which state consumer finance protection 
laws actually would have reduced the quantity of subprime mortgages securitized 
 
CONSUMER L. REV. 278, 287 (2009) (“[T]he states' ability to enforce their consumer 
protection laws was effectively eliminated and, in fact, a regime of de facto ‘field 
preemption’ of the states' regulatory power has been created.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The 
OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 228 
(2004) (“[T]he OCC has deliberately crafted its rules to accomplish a sweeping preemption 
of state laws that is equivalent to the ‘field preemption’ regime established by the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) for federal savings associations and their operating 
subsidiaries.”). But see Dori K. Bailey, A Defense of the Doctrine of Preemption: Revealing 
the Fallacy That Federal Preemption Contributed to the Financial Crisis, 16 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1041, 1097–1103 (2014) (arguing that the preemption of state laws affecting loan 
origination did not contribute to  the 2008 crisis). 
54 Elizabeth Warren, Banks: State Laws Not for Us, CREDIT SLIPS (May 6, 2008, 8:21 PM) https:// 
www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/05/banks-state-law.html [https://perma.cc/ZY57- D2V7]. 
55 See SYKES, supra note 39, at 16 (“The OCC explained that it intended the phrase ‘obstruct, 
impair, or condition’ to function as the distillation of the various preemption constructs 
articulated by the Supreme Court . . . and not as a replacement construct that is in any way 
inconsistent with those standards.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
56 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 
1905 (Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34). This certainly implies that the 2004 
OCC rules did not purport to preempt all state laws related to the business of banking. 
57 See e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to 
Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 897 (2011) (“Regulatory 
inaction and preemption by federal banking agencies played a significant role in allowing 
abusive nonprime lending to grow and spread during the past decade.”); LEI DING, ROBERTO 
G. QUERCIA, CAROLINA REID & ALAN WHITE, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAPITAL, THE PREEMPTION 
EFFECT: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAWS 
ON THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 19 (2010) (“[P]reemption consistently increased the default 
risk of privately securitized mortgages originated by the OCC lenders . . . .”). 
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at the time of the 2008 financial crisis is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
beyond dispute that subprime lending was a major factor in the crisis.58 
B. Dodd-Frank’s Response 
 
In 2010, Dodd-Frank made two targeted changes to the preemption 
standards for state “consumer financial laws,” which are defined as state laws 
“that do[] not directly or indirectly discriminate against national banks and 
that directly and specifically regulate[] the manner, content, or terms and 
conditions of any financial transaction” of a “consumer.”59 First, Dodd-Frank 
revised the scope of state laws affecting the operation of national banks 
preempted under the National Bank Act. Second, Dodd-Frank mandated 
courts to use Skidmore deference when evaluating rules promulgated by the 
OCC which purport to preempt state law. 
 Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank set out three alternative criteria for the 
preemption of state consumer financial protection laws. First, such a law 
could be preempted if it had a “discriminatory effect on national banks, in 
comparison with the effect of the law on a bank chartered by that State.”60 
This provision clearly displays an interest in the parity of state and national 
bank charters, much in the same way that Riegle-Neil did with respect to 
interstate branching. 
 Second, a state consumer finance protection law could be preempted 
if “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” established in 
Barnett Bank, “the State consumer financial law prevents or significantly 
interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”61 Clearly this 
provision implies that Congress believed the 2004 OCC rules went beyond 
the preemption standard established in Barnett Bank.62 Notably, this 
provision also limited OCC determinations that a state law was preempted 
under Dodd-Frank to case-by-case determinations, and only after 
consultation with the newly created Consumer Finance Protection Bureau.63  
 
58 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES xxiii (2011) (“We conclude collapsing mortgage-lending standards and 
the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis.”). 
59 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2). 
60 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A). 
61 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B); see also Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) 
(providing the preemption standard). 
62 Otherwise there would be no reason to revise the relevant preemption standard after the 
2004 OCC rules. 
63 See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he term ‘case-by-case basis’ refers to a determination 
pursuant to this section made by the Comptroller concerning the impact of a particular State 
consumer financial law on any national bank . . . .”); 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(B) (“When 
making a determination on a case-by-case basis that a State consumer financial law of 
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Third, a state law could be preempted if it was preempted by federal 
law outside of Title 62, in which Dodd-Frank is housed.64 
 If there was any doubt as to whether the Dodd-Frank preemption 
standard would actually narrow the preemption powers of the OCC, cases 
immediately following Dodd-Frank’s passage eliminated it. In 2011, a 
federal court held in In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation that 
national banks were not exempt from certain state “bad faith” tort actions that 
related to the management of depository accounts.65 This holding was 
especially notable because under OCC rules both before and after Dodd-
Frank, state law concerning the management of checking accounts was 
usually preempted.66 More recently in 2018, the Supreme Court denied cert 
in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., in which the 9th Circuit had held that 
state laws requiring nationally chartered banks to pay interest on escrow 
accounts were not preempted under Dodd-Frank’s preemption standards, 
despite the fact that interest payments on deposits lie at the heart of banking 
activity.67 Some commentators have suggested, however, that the Supreme 
Court’s unwillingness to grant cert in that case may have had more to do with 
certain Justices’ hostility to Chevron deference, rather than their opinions on 
OCC preemption.68 
Regardless of its precise effects, Section 1044 was clearly intended to 
restrict the extent to which the OCC can allow national banks to operate 
independent of state laws relating to consumer finance protection. In fact, the 
original proposal for financial reform crafted by the Obama Administration 
in June of 2009 would have “eliminated NBA preemption of state consumer 
 
another State has substantively equivalent terms as one that the Comptroller is preempting, 
the Comptroller shall first consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection . . . .”). 
64 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(C). 
65 See In Re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1320, 1322 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011) (applying “the standard for preemption in the context of the NBA [as] provided 
by an amendment to the NBA, found in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010”). 
66 See Gregory D. Omer, Federal Banking Law Preemption in the Post-Dodd Frank World: A 
Review of Significant Developments, BANKING L. COMM. J. (A.B.A., Chi., Ill.), Apr. 1, 2019, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/committee_newsletters/ban
k ing/2019/201904/fa_1/ [https://perma.cc/LH2S-MRUQ] (citing Bank Activities and 
Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1916 (Jan. 13, 2004) and 12 
C.F.R. 7.4007(b)(2) (2020)). 
67 Lusnak v. Bank of Am., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194–97 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 567 (2018).  
68 See Andrew Tauber, Reginald R. Goeke & David L. Beam, US Supreme Court Refuses to 
Review Ninth Circuit Lusnak Decision Requiring National Banks to Abide by State Interest-
on-Escrow Laws, MAYER BROWN (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/ 
perspectives-events/publications/2018/11/us-supreme-court-refuses-to-review-ninth-circuit-i 
[https://perma.cc/2HT9-M5R2] (suggesting that Lusnak, a decision “palpably wrong and 
contrary to long-standing precedent governing a critical area of the economy,” was a prime 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to limit Chevron deference). 
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protection laws altogether.”69 This approach failed to gain traction in 
Congress, and the codification of Barnett Bank’s preemption standard in 
Section 1044 was ultimately proposed by then-representative Barney Frank 
of Massachusetts.70 
The second notable preemption provision in Section 1044 is the 
command to courts to “assess the validity” of OCC preemption 
determinations “depending upon the thoroughness evident in the 
consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the 
consistency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other 
factors which the court finds persuasive and relevant to its decision.”71 This 
language is directly lifted from Skidmore v. Swift & Co., a decision which 
evaluated a federal agency’s interpretive rules for consistency with law 
according to what is now called Skidmore deference.72 At a descriptive level, 
mandating Skidmore deference as opposed to Chevron deference makes any 
OCC rulemakings less likely to pass judicial review, as Skidmore review is 
less deferential than Chevron review, which only requires that agency 
interpretations of the statute be reasonable.73 At least one study has found that 
agency interpretations reviewed under Skidmore are 21.4% less likely to 
survive judicial scrutiny than those reviewed under Chevron deference.74 
More importantly, what the command to use Skidmore deference 
really entails is a radical departure from agency procedure as we know it 
today.75 Courts reviewing OCC preemption determinations cannot defer to 
the OCC’s interpretation of Dodd-Frank or the National Bank Act. They must 
decide each preemption question as a matter of law, effectively entrusting 
each “case-by-case” preemption decision to the judiciary, with the hope that 
the assigned judge is amenable to Dodd-Frank’s policy goals. 
 
 
 
69 SYKES, supra note 39, at 19. 
70 Id. 
71 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
72 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that waiting time could 
count as working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938). 
73 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
74 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 6 (2017) (“[A]gency interpretations were significantly more likely to prevail under Chevron 
deference (77.4%) than Skidmore deference (56.0%) or, especially, de novo review (38.5%).”). 
75 Section 1044’s hostility to Chevron deference is another area in which Dodd-Frank seems 
comparatively conservative. Generally, limiting the reach of Chevron deference is associated 
with conservative legal advocates. See Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, High Court Could 
Take First Step to Chevron Doctrine’s Demise, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 28, 2019, 4:56 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/high-court-could-take-first-step-to-chevron-
doctrines-demise [https://perma.cc/E5C7-PM6P] (“Conservatives have increasingly 
attacked [the Auer and Chevron] doctrines in service of a grander plan to curb the 
administrative state.”). 
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III. SECTION 1044’S INCONSISTENCIES WITH FEDERALISM AND DUAL 
BANKING 
 
It is important to note the kind of Federalism problem that Section 
1044 presents. Formally, there is no purely constitutional issue with Section 
1044. The federal government is generally free to curtail the degree to which 
it authorizes its agencies to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, 
which establishes that federal law “made in [p]ursuance” of the Constitution 
is “the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and.”76 This includes agency rulemakings as 
authorized by federal law which express the intent of Congress as evaluated 
under Chevron deference, or presumably other standards of administrative 
review as instructed by Congress.77 Conversely, as long as the OCC’s 2004 rules 
were a reasonable interpretation of the statutory authority accorded to the agency 
under the National Bank Act, or later by Dodd-Frank, then they should be valid. 
Alternatively, if the scope of the preemption afforded by the 2004 rules was too 
broad to be a reasonable interpretation of Congress’s intent, then they should be 
invalidated. At their core, these are all questions of statutory interpretation. 
 Other traditional constitutional Federalism disputes are also not 
applicable here. The preemption that follows national bank charters does not 
implicate the regulation of any traditional state functions by the federal 
government,78 or federal funding requirements,79 or the commandeering of 
state officials or resources.80 The Federalism problem that arises here may be 
unique, in that the extent to which state law is preempted depends on the 
number of available and operating national bank charters, but this does not 
seem like a distinction worthy of constitutional significance. Recent 
 
76 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
77 But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1442 (2008) (arguing that Chevron should not apply in full for purposes of the 
Supremacy Clause because, strictly speaking, rulemakings are not federal law made in 
pursuance of the Constitution). 
78 See e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985) (discarding 
the project of identifying “traditional governmental functions,” which are immune from 
federal regulation). 
79 See e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012) (holding that the 
Medicaid expansion conditions under the Affordable Care Act were as coercive as “a gun to 
the head”); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (holding that the federal 
government conditioning highway funding on states setting their legal drinking age to 
twenty-one was not coercive). 
80 See e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act was unconstitutional in part because it commandeered state and 
local law enforcement officers to aid the federal government in enforcing background 
checks); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding that the “take title” 
provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, which forced 
certain states to take title to nuclear waste, constituted unconstitutional commandeering). 
Vol. 6:2]         Anti-Federalist Banking Policy Under Dodd-Frank  
 
 
325 
challenges based on this observation that rely on the Tenth Amendment have 
been largely ineffective in the Fintech context, where state banks and state 
bank regulators have challenged special purpose national Fintech charters 
made available to non-bank financial institutions, worrying the charters 
would allow a broader market of financial companies to avoid state law 
through federal preemption.81 
 The actual Federalism problem with Section 1044 is that it departs 
from our Dual Banking system and the Federalism benefits that this system 
guarantees. By empowering state banking agencies to regulate the banking 
activities of federal banks, Section 1044 takes us towards more of a state-
centered banking monoculture instead of a system predicated on parity 
between state and nationally chartered banks that exist in distinct regulatory 
spheres. While it may seem counterintuitive, federal preemption of state law 
in this context actually serves the cause of Federalism by preserving 
competition between state and national banks to promote financial 
innovation82 and ensuring democratic accountability and political 
transparency,83 which not only guarantees that banking policy will be 
democratic, but also that it can evolve through productive national discourse. 
 Section 1044 is also unnecessary given that the structure of our 
federal government protects states from encroachment by federal banking 
regulators,84 states possess institutional clout with federal regulators85 
through which they can affect federal banking policy, and states have a 
certain residuum of regulatory power due to some banks’ preference for local 
regulators.86 In short, Section 1044 deprives us of Federalism benefits in a 
policy area in which states are clearly capable of fending off Federal 
encroachment on their own. 
 
A. Competition and Policy Innovation 
  
One of the most commonly cited benefits of our Federalism is the 
experimentation and competition that it fosters between states, and in a Dual 
Banking context these benefits also accrue to the state and federal banking 
systems. As Larry Kramer said, states can compete on terms of “regulatory 
innovation” for “capital and taxpayers.”87 Or, as Justice Brandeis phrased it 
 
81 See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, No. 1:18-cv-02449, 2019 WL 4194541 
(D.D.C. 2018) (listing the grievances that the CSBS has with the OCC’s Fintech charter). 
82 See infra Section III.A. 
83 See infra Section III.B. 
84 See infra Section III.C. 
85 See infra Section III.D. 
86 See infra Section III.E  
87 Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994). 
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in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, states may “serve as a laboratory . . . 
without risk to the rest of the country.”88 
The problem with Section 1044’s three preemption conditions is that 
they reduce the extent to which competition can occur both between state and 
federally chartered banks, as well as between different state banks. National 
charters are already a clear minority in the grand scheme of our banking 
system, with the FDIC reporting 7,214 OCC charters as of November 27, 
2020, compared to 17,341 state-chartered banking institutions.89 By 
subjecting all nationally chartered banks to “a litany of consumer protection 
rules that vary from state to state,”90 Dodd-Frank may ultimately reduce the 
attractiveness of federal charters or encourage consolidation in order to 
spread the cost of regulatory compliance, undermining the goal of charter 
competition in terms of parity.91 
Limiting the preemptive effect of the NBA also threatens to 
compromise charter competition as between states, as occurred in Madden v. 
Midland Funding, a post Dodd-Frank case from the Second Circuit in which 
the court held that “federal preemption of state usury laws under the National 
Banking Act does not extend to certain entities holding debt originated by 
national banks.”92 These entities include many third party holders of debt 
originated by national banks, reducing the ability of national banks to 
originate and sell debt effectively.93 One of the principal benefits of the NBA 
is that it limits the effect of state laws on the “business of banking,” including 
loan origination, to those laws passed by the state in which a state bank is 
chartered, “allow[ing] lenders and borrowers to avoid time-consuming 
investigation of each state’s usury laws by ensuring that a lender generally 
need only consider the usury law that governs in the state listed on its 
 
88 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
89 Institution Directory: Current List of All Institutions, FDIC, (Nov. 27, 2020), 
https://www7.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp [https://perma.cc/7PFP-7B2R]. 
90 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 47, at 83. 
91 See Avner Mendelson, Survival Strategy: Cut the Number of Banks in Half, AM. BANKER: 
BANKTHINK (Jan. 30, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/survival-
strategy-cut-the-number-of-banks-in-half [https://perma.cc/DFY3-3R32 ] (noting the rising 
rate of consolidation of banks over the last two decades). See generally RON FELDMAN & 
PAUL SCHRECK, FED. RSRV. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ASSESSING COMMUNITY BANK 
CONSOLIDATION (2014), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/pubs/eppapers/14-
1/epp_14-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8U8-7PH3] (examining research that suggests that 
increased regulatory burdens after the financial crisis have accelerated the consolidation of 
community banks). 
92 See Michael Marvin, Interest Exportation and Preemption: Madden’s Impact on National 
Banks, the Secondary Credit Market, and P2P Lending, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1807, 1807 
(2016); Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying the 
“significantly interfere” standard from Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)). 
93 See Marvin, supra note 92, at 1814 (“These new transaction costs imposed by Madden are 
particularly high because remedies for usury law violations also vary among states.”). 
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charter.”94 This is especially reasonable given the large variance in state usury 
limits, which can vary from 25% to 8% without much reason across state 
lines, but the number of state laws affecting the “business of banking” which 
could hamper efficient interstate banking are too numerous to mention.95 
Liberal preemption standards are necessary in order to allow both national 
and state-chartered banks to compete on equal terms with other state banks, 
which makes both systems more efficient and allows for local policy 
variation and innovation. 
This reality is reflected both in the history of intra and interstate 
branching, in which state banks pressed the national government and the 
governments of their sister states to modernize their banking systems to allow 
more liberal branching.96 It continues in the wide diversity of regulatory 
regimes which govern each state charter system. For instance, while at the 
federal level, and in most states, charters may be obtained for credit unions, 
thrifts and regular bank institutions, some states such as Delaware and 
Wyoming do not offer credit union charters.97 Many states, such as 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey consolidate chartering and supervision of all 
of their depository institutions in one state agency, whereas at the federal 
level they are dispersed.98 Even now, the federal government is 
 
94 Id. The effect of this part of the NBA is similar to the Delaware internal affairs doctrine. 
See e.g., McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218–19 (Del. 1987) (applying the internal 
affairs doctrine to limit the effect of non-Delaware law on the Delaware corporation in question). 
95 Marvin, supra note 92, at 1816. 
96 See supra Section I.A. 
97 SUNSET ADVISORY COMM’N, SUNSET HEARING MATERIAL 9 (2008), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20081030022451/http://www.sunset.state.tx.us/81streports/cud/cud_hm.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VDD2-B6YF]. 
98 The Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities is responsible for approving 
charter applications for Pennsylvania state-chartered banks. See 7 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1005, 
1007 (2020) (describing the application process for Pennsylvania state charter applicants). 
The state legislature also gave it the power to “exercise . . . discretionary powers,” 
“promulgat[e] . . . rules and regulations,” and “examin[e] and supervis[e]” depository 
institutions. 7 PA. CONS. STAT. § 103(b) (2020). See also 7 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 112, 115, 
1604, 1605, 1703, 1808 (2020) (authorizing various supervisory and regulatory powers for 
the Department). The New Jersey Department of Banking & Insurance is also responsible 
for approving charter applications for depository institutions chartered by the state of New 
Jersey, as well as supervising those institutions. See N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:9A-9, 17:12B-
14, 17:12B-246 (2020) (setting out the charter application requirements for New Jersey 
chartered depository institutions); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:9-43 (2020) (establishing the 
examination, supervisory and regulatory authority of the Commissioner of the New Jersey 
Department of Banking & Insurance). Compare these schemes with the federal one, which 
features a multitude of regulators. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is 
responsible for the chartering of National Banks and Federal Savings Associations. 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 21, 1464. The National Credit Union Administration charters federal credit unions. 12 
U.S.C. § 1759. But the number of regulators, examiners, and supervisors that oversee these 
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experimenting with the establishment of new “Fintech” charters in order to 
extend financial supervision into the “shadow banking” industry, which has 
evaded most regulation and supervision since 2008.99 
All of this experimentation has not been fruitless. States have taken a 
particularly rigorous role in promoting the development of financial services, 
inspiring our modern form of checking accounts, branching, real estate 
lending, deposit insurance (a policy whose invention is usually attributed to 
the federal government), and trust services, which have since been emulated 
by the banks of sister states and national banks.100 
 
B. Democratic Accountability and Political Discourse 
 
Another source of conflict between Section 1044’s preemption 
provisions and Federalism principles is their tendency to erode democratic 
accountability. Just as when “the Federal Government compels States to 
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is 
diminished,”101 when the federal government allows state regulators to set 
policy for national banks, or other state banks, it becomes unclear which 
government is responsible for that action. Granted, our system of financial 
regulation is already hopelessly complex, but that does not mean that we 
should not work towards something better. A world in which the public can 
better understand and take action to reform national or state financial 
institutions is a world in which more reform would likely occur. The federalist 
 
institutions includes the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Credit 
Union Administration themselves as well as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau to name a few. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44918, WHO REGULATES 
WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7–16 (2017). For 
a sympathetic view of this regulatory diversity and more detail on the federal financial 
regulatory landscape, see Lawrence J. White, In Defense of Regulatory Diversity, MONEY & 
BANKING (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.moneyandbanking.com/commentary/2017/10/14/in-
defense-of-regulatory-diversity [https://perma.cc/85NL-ZHWF]. 
99 See Todd H. Baker, Charter or Not, Fintechs Are Already ‘Banking’, AMERICAN BANKER: 
BANKTHINK (Nov. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/charter-
or-not-fintechs-are-already-banking [https://perma.cc/3CF4-Z7PH] (discussing Fintech 
charters and whether “inviting fintech, along with other types of parallel and shadow banking 
entities, into the regulated banking system—rather than pushing them away—is the right 
policy outcome to manage systemic risks”). 
100 Schroeder, supra note 40, at 201 (citing Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State 
Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 
58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1156 (1990)). 
101 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (discussing how the 
commandeering of the State of New York per the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act reduced the accountability of the Federal government by allowing it to act 
through New York). 
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principles of democratic accountability underlying the holding in New York v. 
United States with respect to the anti-commandeering principle apply in full 
force here, even if Section 1044 does not constitute commandeering.102 
Limiting the application of state banking law to the banks chartered 
by a given state also serves the discursive benefits of Federalism by 
facilitating “‘dissenting by deciding,’ giving political outliers an opportunity 
to force engagement, set the national agenda,” and “offer a real-life 
instantiation of their views.”103 Clear examples of this kind of dissenting by 
deciding include the early adoption of depository insurance by eight states— 
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Mississippi, North 
Dakota, and Washington after the panic of 1907—decades before the national 
government established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.104 These 
programs were all the more notable because they initially put their state-
chartered institutions at a competitive disadvantage because of insurance 
costs, which their less scrupulous sister states and national bank competitors 
did not have to pay. These states eventually won the national conversation 
when the federal government acted after the Great Depression to establish the 
FDIC.105 It is unclear whether the national government would have taken this 
action without the living case studies of these early adopters. 
Another good example of the discursive benefits of Federalism 
leading to concrete national change is the national evolution of branching 
previously mentioned in this paper.106 The McFadden and later acts were 
clear federal responses to aggressive state reforms which forced the hand of 
the national government into partially legalizing intra and interstate 
branching, in fear that their charters and other state charters would become 
obsolete.107 While this change may appear a banal economic reform to most, 
the development of complex branching in America was revolutionary, and 
vigorously opposed by entrenched skeptics of banking who often harbored 
 
102 Id. 
103 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 
1889, 1895 (2014). 
104 Eugene Nelson White, State-Sponsored Insurance of Bank Deposits in the United States, 
1907–1929, 41 J. ECON. HIST., 537, 537–38 (1981). 
105 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 12B(a), 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (current 
version at 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a)). 
106 See supra Section I.A. 
107 See generally Gary Richardson, Daniel Park, Alejandro Komai & Michael Gou, 
McFadden Act of 1927, FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY, (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www. 
federalreservehistory.org/essays/mcfadden_act [https://perma.cc/3TRP-JV2Z] (discussing 
the history of the McFadden Act); Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, Constituencies 
and Legislation: The Fight Over The McFadden Act Of 1927, at 2 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., 
Working Paper No. 17266, 2011) (“Before the McFadden Act, some states allowed state 
banks to open multiple branches, while others prohibited all branching. However, nationally 
chartered banks were, in all cases, not allowed to open branches . . . As a result, an increasing 
number of national banks gave up their charter . . . .”) (citations omitted).  
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paranoias regarding large financial institutions related to anti-Semitism, 
including representative McFadden himself.108 These changes would allow 
banks to diversify their geographic risk pools enough to permit later liberal 
reform such as the Community Reinvestment Act, which was passed in part 
due to the lack of credit provided to underserved communities in certain states 
which “prohibited interstate branching or acquisitions and in some cases 
restricted even intrastate branching, reducing competition,” and 
“contribut[ing] to the perception that banking institutions were failing to 
adequately serve the credit needs of some residents of their communities.”109 
It stands to reason that the more we allow states to impede on each other’s 
ability to innovate their banking practices and bring those innovations into 
the national conversation, the less innovation we will actually see. Section 
1044 makes it easier for states to stand in the way of this kind of innovation. 
 
C. State Law is Protected by the Structure of the Federal Government 
 
If we were concerned about the ability of states to influence national 
policy at all, then perhaps Section 1044’s preemption provisions would be 
warranted, but all the evidence suggests that states are perfectly capable of 
influencing the federal consumer finance laws that apply directly to national 
banks. The traditional arguments advanced by the Garcia court regarding 
states’ abilities to influence national policy apply here.110 While the electoral 
college is apportioned to somewhat over-represent states as opposed to 
 
108 McFadden was likely not the only member of Congress whose banking policy was 
informed by anti-Semitism, but he may have been the most outspoken. See Congress Acts to 
Expunge McFadden Remarks on Jews, JEWISH DAILY BULL., June 2, 1933, at 4 (reporting 
on a Congressional motion to expunge anti-Semitic remarks by Representative McFadden, 
which included quotations from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the House of 
Representatives). It is no accident that this prejudiced outburst was inspired by the 
Congress’s consideration of the United States going off of the gold standard, which occurred 
within a week on June 5, 1933. H.R.J. Res. 192, 73rd Cong. (1933). 
109 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Rsrv., Speech at the Community Affairs Research 
Conference, Washington, D.C.: The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New 
Challenges, (Mar. 30, 2007), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke 
20070330a.htm [https://perma.cc/KGC3-XCP2]. 
110 Kramer, supra note 87, at 1488–90. In Garcia, the Supreme Court noted the importance 
of the Senate as a political guarantee of State sovereignty. 
[The states] were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State 
received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected by the 
legislature of his State. The significance attached to the States' equal 
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any 
constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal representation without 
the State's consent. 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985) (citations omitted). 
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people,111 the clearer example of the political safeguards of Federalism is the 
Senate, which was famously designed to directly represent state interests.112 
The limitations on federal power that the Garcia court claimed Article I 
creates are not relevant here, as bank chartering is a concurrent state and 
federal affair. At any rate, as Larry Kramer points out, the interpretation of 
Article I as an exclusive list of federal powers has been “obliterated” by the 
development of Commerce Clause doctrine since the early 20th Century.113 
Still, the disproportionate power that the Senate and the Electoral College 
afford to states in the federal government should allow them to influence 
federal banking policy such that direct state regulation of nationally chartered 
banks is unnecessary. 
While the 17th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has arguably 
watered down the power that the Senate gives states over national policy, it 
has not eliminated it, and a brief survey of the history of bank regulation in 
the United States reveals constant allowances for state authority.114 In 
addition to the examples already mentioned, the very structure of the federal 
reserve system as established in 1913 reveals compromises for state interests. 
In what has come to be known as the Wilsonian Compromise, the Federal 
Reserve’s Board of Governors was decentralized in regional reserve banks 
and staffed by private bankers from around the country in order to maintain 
a “balance of power . . . between local and national figures, much as the U.S. 
Constitution had done with states and national governments.”115 The 
Consumer Finance Protection Bureau itself, as established under Dodd-
Frank, is proof that states are perfectly capable of establishing national 
institutions and laws to ensure that national banks are kept in check and 
adequately regulated within the realm of consumer finance and other areas of 
financial regulation. 
This Congressional respect for the parity of state and national charters 
and for state banking regimes generally vindicates “Wechsler’s claim that 
states are protected because Congress must overcome a heavy ‘burden of 
persuasion’ before displacing state law” even if this belief is not generally 
“an important part of the political scene in Washington today.”116 Even if 
there is no presumption against federal intrusion as a political norm in the 
 
111 In that the electoral college apportions electors according to the number of Senate seats 
each state has, in addition to the number of representatives to which it is entitled. 
112 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 87, at 1489 (“[S]tates have direct control over the Senate 
through their equal representation in that body . . . .”). 
113 Id. at 1488; cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 324–26, 424 (1819) 
(finding that the necessary and proper clause authorizes the creation of a national bank).  
114 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (ending the direct election of Senators). 
115 See CONTI-BROWN, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing the motivating principles behind the 
unique structure of the federal reserve). 
116 Kramer, supra note 87, at 1505. 
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modern Congress, in the realm of banking policy, it seems that there truly is 
a “local sensitivity to central intervention” as Wechsler suggested was 
necessary to protect our Federalism.117 Even if our administrative agencies, 
such as the OCC, are not interested in preserving state consumer finance laws, 
there is nothing stopping Congress from passing its own which apply to 
national banks, as it has in the recent past. This approach would also likely 
result in more effective financial regulation, as “not all state agencies have 
experience with such large and complex institutions” like those which 
commonly acquire federal charters.118 
 
D. States Possess Institutional Power over Federal Regulators 
 
Another important check that states can rely on in order to establish 
their preferred consumer protection regime is the highly integrated nature of 
our banking regulatory system. In fact, federal regulators, and especially 
FDIC supervisors, who conduct regular “examinations”119 of all state and 
federal FDIC insured banks rely on state regulators for large amounts of 
financial information. Bank examination is a specialized form of regulation 
in which examiners review the financial data of a bank on a regular basis in 
order to assess its “safety and soundness,” which refers to the general health 
of the institution in question.120 Federal examiners take examination data and 
generate what is referred to as a “CAMELS” rating, which assesses certain 
objective factors, like capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings levels and 
adequacy, liquidity adequacy, and sensitivity to market risk, as well as 
subjective information such as management capability, which relates to 
whether the bank’s management makes sound decisions and operates their 
bank in a way which ensures “safety and soundness.”121 CAMELS ratings are 
 
117 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 547 (1954). 
118 Schroeder, supra note 40, at 202. 
119 For insight on the examination process from the FDIC’s perspective, see generally Bank 
Examinations, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/ [https://perma.cc/5N 
BA-6G5G] (last updated Oct. 19, 2020). 
120 See generally Safety & Soundness Supervision, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS, 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/bank-supervision/supervision-and-regulation/safety-soundness-
supervision [https://perma.cc/9TML-9MUD] (providing an overview of the goals of 
examination); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., DIV. OF SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL 3 (2020), https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/publications/files/cbem.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YMY-VZZP] (defining safety 
and soundness as “including assessing risk-management systems and financial condition as 
well as determining compliance with laws and regulations”). 
121 See id. at 7 (describing the six components of the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating 
System, or “CAMELS” system). For a succinct summary of the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System and the consequences of adverse CAMELS ratings, see Julie 
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extremely meaningful to banks and other depository institutions, as they 
influence the premium that must be paid for deposit insurance, change the 
relative likelihood of facing sanctions from supervisors, and affect banks’ 
ability to expand or hire officers and directors.122 And importantly, adverse 
CAMELS ratings are ordinarily not eligible for judicial review, but are 
instead subject to limited internal appeals processes which vary by 
regulator.123 Indeed, some banks never receive any potential to appeal 
because the consequence of receiving a significantly adverse CAMELS 
rating may be swift involuntary receivership by the FDIC and liquidation.124 
Especially since the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 
1950, the FDIC and other federal regulators have relied on state agencies for 
the information that they use to generate CAMELS reports, putting them in a 
“crucial role in administering federal law,” especially with regards to the 
determination of subjective management factors.125 Section 10(d)(9) of the 
FDI Act effectively mandates the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council to reduce the extent to which federal supervisors engage in 
duplicative, costly examinations, and instead instructs federal and state 
banking agencies to work together in numerous areas, including: 
Conducting alternate, joint, and concurrent examinations of 
insured depository institutions, and of the branches and 
agencies of foreign banks that have been chartered by the 
states; Processing safety and soundness examination reports 
and applications on a timely basis; Using common 
examination report and application forms; Developing and 
issuing informal (e.g., board resolutions, memoranda of 
 
Andersen Hill, When Bank Examiners Get it Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of 
Material Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1107–11 (2015) and 
accompanying footnotes. 
122 Id. at 1108–09. 
123 12 U.S.C. § 4806(f); see also Hill, supra note 121, at 1115–60 (discussing the history and 
nature of OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and NCUA material supervisory determinations 
appeals processes).  
124 But see Builders Bank v. FDIC, 846 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that CAMELS ratings 
are not beyond judicial review, and disclosing Builders Bank’s CAMELS rating); Nikhil Gore, 
Seventh Circuit Holds Open a Narrow Path for Challenging Bank Supervisory Ratings, 
COVINGTON, (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.covfinancialservices.com/2017/02/seventh- circuit-
holds-open-a-narrow-path-for-challenging-bank-supervisory-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/7RBN- 
KR77] (discussing the promise that Builders Bank holds for the judicial review of CAMELS 
ratings). The vast majority of bank liquidations make judicial review of CAMELS ratings 
impossible. Id. Even Builders Bank did not survive long enough to finish its appeal. Builders 
NAB LLC v. FDIC, 922 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Before the case could be resolved 
on remand, however, Builders Bank merged into a non-bank enterprise, Builders NAB LLC, 
and left the banking business.”). 
125 See Gerken, supra note 103, at 1903 (discussing the leverage that states and local actors 
gain over the Federal government by being administrators of federal law). 
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understanding or other similar agreements) and formal 
enforcement actions; Exchanging supervisory information; 
Offering federal agency training programs to state examiners; 
and Providing access to the federal agency databases.126 
 This allows state banking agencies to influence federal CAMELS 
ratings for all banks within their jurisdiction, turning “dissenters into 
decisionmakers, not just lobbyists or supplicants,” and allowing them to “set 
policy rather than merely complain about it.”127 Unfortunately due to the 
immense secrecy surrounding supervisory information,128 it is hard to say 
how much state supervisory data has actually influenced federal examination 
policy, but it is clearly possible for states to adjust the way in which they 
report managerial competency to the FDIC, using their own standards and 
language, in order to increase or decrease the scrutiny that certain lending 
practices or national banking institutions face.129 
 This “power of the servant” is endowed in state banking agencies 
simply by virtue of the immense difficulty of accumulating supervisory 
information. As with other areas of federal policy mandates, the federal 
government must rely on states to get the job of FDIC supervision done, 
which grants states “leverage” and “discretion in choosing how to accomplish 
[their] tasks.”130 And the fact that CAMELS ratings are effectively 
unreviewable by courts means that these state-influenced determinations 
would have immense staying power pending some costly federal change in 
examination policy. 
 
126 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RMS MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, at 1.1-11, https:// 
www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FVA-EWXH]. 
127 Gerken, supra note 103, at 1903. 
128 For a comprehensive discussion of the great lengths to which federal regulators go in 
order to keep supervisory information confidential, see Margaret E. Tahyar, Are Bank 
Regulators Special?, CLEARING HOUSE: BANK POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www. 
theclearinghouse.org/banking-perspectives/2018/2018-q1-banking-perspectives/articles/ 
are-bank-regulators-special [https://perma.cc/5S94-Q5CC] (last visited Apr. 15, 2020). 
129 We know at least that state banking agencies are represented on the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council through the State Liaison Committee, whose chairman is a 
voting member of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. State 
Representation in Federal Agencies, CONF. ST. BANK SUPERVISORS, (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.csbs.org/state-representation-federal-agencies [https://perma.cc/JM3C-8TH2]. 
This means that States have some formal voting power to influence “uniform principles, standards, 
and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions.” About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. 
INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, (Apr. 15, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z7MR-7PZY].  
130 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1266 (2009). 
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Additionally, because state regulators serve “two masters,” and one 
could argue they more directly serve their state constituencies,131 they are not 
directly accountable to federal banking agencies that might object to the way 
in which this data is collected.132 
 Another example of regulatory integration serving as a source of state 
power that renders Section 1044’s preemption provisions unnecessary comes 
from within Dodd-Frank itself. Since the inception of Dodd-Frank, the CFPB 
has presented itself as an ally to state attorneys general in the fight against 
predatory lending. In an address to the National Association of Attorneys 
General in March of 2011, the first official director of the CFPB, Richard 
Cordray, stated that the CFPB was “committed to building a strong 
partnership” with state attorneys general.133 Part of the motivation for this 
alliance stemmed from the shared policy objectives of the CFPB and state 
attorneys general, as well as the limited resources of the CFPB, but it also 
followed from a recognition of the expertise of state attorneys general in areas 
where Cordray noted that they had “preceded” the CFPB.134 Simply put, state 
attorneys general had been at the task of consumer finance protection for much 
longer than the CFPB had. Ultimately, consumer finance regulation is a 
national effort. Loans originated in Montana end up in collateralized debt 
obligations in Manhattan, and the federal government must rely on 
partnerships with state attorneys general to enforce federal banking policy. 
An early example of this kind of cooperation occurred while Elizabeth 
Warren was still acting head of the CFPB. In a report to state attorneys 
 
131 One particularly interesting example of state bank agencies flouting federal law to serve 
the interests of their constituencies is the tolerance of marijuana banking in jurisdictions that 
have legalized the substance at the state level. See Colorado Banks Quietly Serving Cannabis 
Industry, INS. J. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2019/10/04/ 
544488.htm [https://perma.cc/HY67-HMHN] (noting that at least “35 banks and credit 
unions” served marijuana businesses from 2014 to 2019); Jesse Paul, Colorado’s Top 
Federal Prosecutor Says Banks Working with Marijuana Industry Have “No Carve Out” 
From Prosecutions, COLO. SUN (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:00 AM) https://coloradosun.com/2019/10/ 
02/marijuana-banking-federal-prosecution-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/K3NC-MZSD] (suggesting 
that federal prosecutors are well aware of the illegality of these operations); see also Tom Angell, 
State Financial Regulators Press Congress to Allow Marijuana Banking Access, FORBES (Apr. 
16, 2019, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/2019/04/16/state-financial-reg 
ulators-press-congress-to-allow-marijuana-banking-access/#13625ce055c9 [https://perma.cc/ 
6GGB-4YTL] (reporting on some bank regulators’ efforts to secure congressional approval 
of marijuana banking). 
132 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 130, at 1270–71. 
133 Richard Cordray, Remarks at the National Association of Attorneys General Spring 
Meeting: Partnering: The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and State Attorneys 
General (Mar. 8, 2011), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/partnering-
the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-and-state-attorneys-general/ [https://perma.cc/ 
SAC5-36Y9]. 
134 Id. 
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general, the CFPB’s Consumer Bureau announced that the country’s “five 
largest mortgage firms . . . saved more than $20 billion since the housing 
crisis began in 2007 by taking shortcuts in processing troubled borrowers’ 
home loans.”135 While this report clearly serves as an example of the 
willingness of the CFPB to work with state agencies, at the time it also 
worried lawmakers who were threatened by the apparent “link between the 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, led by [then] Harvard professor 
Elizabeth Warren, and the 50 state attorneys general who [were] leading the 
nationwide probe into the five firms’ improper foreclosure practices.”136 The 
fledgling agency at that time had already begun to provide “advice” to 
attorneys general who were contemplating settlements with those mortgage 
firms, which speaks to a deep connection between the law enforcement 
capacity of state Attorneys General and the new federal consumer finance 
protection regime.137 
Of course, there is always the risk that a national administration 
hostile to the interests of consumer finance protection will take office and 
reduce the effectiveness of federal consumer financial protection laws. The 
Trump administration has done exactly this.138 But we must remember that 
Federalism is a politically neutral principle of American government. Even 
in times in which the federal government opposes their interest in national 
consumer finance policy, states may use federal reliance on their cooperation 
with the CFPB to influence federal policy. And even if they lack any 
productive relationship with federal regulators, states still do not need 
protection from preemption under Section 1044 because of the integration of 
state and federal agencies through bank supervision, and the inherent power 
of Congress to ratchet up regulations for nationally chartered banks. 
 
 
 
135 Shahien Nasiripour, Big Banks Save Billions as Homeowners Suffer, Internal Federal 
Report by CFPB Finds, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/big-
banks-save-billions-homeowners-suffer_n_841712 [https://perma.cc/82UL-MHKP]. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. Then-Professor Warren was forced to admit “under intense questioning” by the House 
Financial Services Committee that this advice had been given. Id. This episode suggests that 
the CFPB may prove an ally to state attorneys general even in spite of federal opposition. 
138 See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Fed’n Am., CFPB Law Enforcement Plummets Under 
Trump Administration, (Mar. 11, 2019), https://consumerfed.org/press_release/16137/ 
[https://perma.cc/SA4E-BPGD] (noting that the decline in enforcement activity was most 
clear “in the areas where the volume of consumer complaints received by the CFPB is the 
highest”); CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER 
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 3 (2019), 
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FZ8-YP8B] (finding that “[t]he average amount of monetary relief per 
case awarded to victims of illegal consumer financial practices has declined by 
approximately 96%” since 2015). 
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E. States Retain Regulatory Power through Localist Preferences 
 
Additionally, state charters retain some regulatory sway even in the 
face of aggressive federal preemption through nationally chartered banks. 
There is a reason why state banks greatly outnumber national banks, and why 
early state reforms like mandatory deposit insurance were able to be pursued 
without state banks overwhelmingly switching to national charters.139 
Ultimately, “some bankers prefer a more provincial regulatory approach, 
expecting local regulators to be more sympathetic to, and familiar with, local 
economic issues and idiosyncrasies.”140 Some might discard this sentiment 
as endorsing nepotism,141 but it is indisputable that some state-chartered 
banks prefer their local regulators to federal alternatives whether that be 
because of institutional ties, or in some cases, lax regulation.142 The many 
instances of lax regulation by state regulators in an attempt to capture banks 
may give pause to some who ardently support state regulators over their 
federal counterparts, but it is also true that some banks may simply “desire to 
work with a local regulatory presence” whose regulatory regime is apt for the 
structure or location of their bank.143 
For many banks, holding onto a state charter or switching from a 
national charter may also help them avoid “significantly higher regulatory 
and examination fees,” in addition to granting them access to favorable local 
laws and “local access to their primary regulators.”144 This is especially true 
as the OCC has suffered from increased turnover in recent years which makes 
building a productive regulatory relationship difficult for many nationally 
chartered banks.145 
Whatever the exact cause of some banks’ preference for state 
regulators may be, it grants states some residual power to regulate according 
 
139 See, e.g., White, supra note 104, at 537 (discussing states’ pioneering of deposit insurance). 
140 Schroeder, supra note 40, at 202. 
141 It is easy to follow the implication that state regulators will go too easy on banks chartered 
in their home state due to favoritism and competition for charters, thus compromising the 
integrity of our financial system. 
142 For an example of state supervision getting too lax, see Texas Bank Insider Abuse, Lax 
Oversight by Directors, Led to First Failure in 18 Months; More Review Needed, REG. REP. 
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.regreport.info/2019/09/26/texas-bank-insider-abuse-lax-over 
sight-by-directors-led-to-first-failure-in-18-months/ [https://perma.cc/7576-FR6D]. See also 
Kevin Wack, Regulatory Competition is Hot Again — and That’s Worrisome, AM. BANKER, 
(Jan. 6, 2019, 10:00 PM) https://www.americanbanker.com/news/regulatory-competition-is-
hot-again-and-thats-worrisome [https://perma.cc/RL6B-M7JG] (providing an overview of 
the hazards of regulatory competition, including the potential for lax supervision). 
143 Schroeder, supra note 40, at 222. 
144 John Reichert & Jim Sheriff, Weighing the Benefits of a State Charter, BANK DIRECTOR 
(Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.bankdirector.com/issues/regulation/weighing-benefits-state-
charter/ [https://perma.cc/CE3Q-ZCPM]. 
145 Id. 
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to their consumer finance protection preferences, at least with respect to 
banks which possess state charters who are unable to preempt relevant state 
law. Of course, this space for legislation and regulation is limited by the 
degree to which state-chartered banks prefer state regulators to national 
regulators because the option to convert to a federal charter is generally open 
to them.146 At some threshold of state regulatory intervention, they would 
make the decision to switch, which is why it is fortunate that states have also 
been uniquely successful in implementing banking policy at the federal level. 
 
IV. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST CONSEQUENCES OF SKIDMORE REVIEW 
 
Besides substantively changing the kind of state laws that were 
eligible for preemption by federal bank regulation under the National Bank 
Act and the Federal Reserve Act, Section 1044 also prescribes a standard of 
review for courts to use when “reviewing any determinations made by the 
Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law.”147 This change offends the 
principles of our Dual Banking system and works against the Federalism 
benefits it ostensibly promotes because it encourages judicial 
policymaking148 within arbitrary federal circuit divisions and does not respect 
the Presidency as an instrument of federal policymaking.149 More generally, 
the Skidmore command under Section 1044 is unnecessary because 
traditional interpretive canons regarding preemption are sufficient to 
safeguard state interests.150 
In order to grasp the Federalism consequences of discarding Chevron 
deference for OCC preemption determinations under Section 1044 of Dodd-
Frank, it is important to note exactly what Skidmore deference is. When 
exercising Chevron deference, a court is not responsible for determining 
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute is correct as a matter of law. 
Instead, the question is whether an agency’s interpretation is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute” in question.151 Where Congress has 
spoken to the issue in question, that is the only reasonable interpretation, but 
where “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision 
 
146 Some have noticed an uptick in state-chartered banks acquiring national charters under 
the Trump administration. See Lalita Clozel, Why Some Banks Are Ditching Their State 
Regulators, WALL ST. J., (Sep. 17, 2019, 12:18 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
some-banks-are-ditching-their-state-regulators-11568693912 [https://perma.cc/Y529-RM8T] 
(reporting that six banks had switched to federal charters since 2017, as opposed to zero 
banks doing so between 2014 and 2016). 
147 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A). 
148 See infra Section IV.A. 
149 See infra Section IV.B. 
150 See infra Section IV.C. 
151 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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of the statute by regulation.”152 In effect, Chevron allows Congress to 
delegate rulemaking authority to agencies, including the OCC (except as 
prohibited by section 1044), within a range of reasonable interpretations of 
the statutes they are entrusted to administer. 
Prior to Chevron,153 administrative interpretations were granted what 
is now referred to as Skidmore deference, which is not based on any express 
or implied delegation of rulemaking authority by Congress to an agency. 
Instead, it is based solely on an agency’s expertise over the matter in question, 
which entitles the agency’s interpretation to deference according to the 
“thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade.”154 Some commentators suggest that 
Skidmore deference is in fact not a kind of deference at all, because the 
Skidmore factors only grant agency interpretations the respect that would 
follow from any generic legal position that is validly reasoned and 
persuasive.155 As the late Justice Scalia put it, “the rule of Skidmore deference 
is an empty truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: A judge should 
take into account the well-considered views of expert observers.”156 
The policy reasons that motivated the Dodd-Frank congress to create 
Section 1044’s Skidmore provision are self-evident, “in light of the OCC’s 
history of controversial preemption decisions based on conflict-of-interest 
and regulatory-capture concerns.”157 By limiting the amount of deference 
OCC preemption determinations were given, Congress hoped to limit the 
degree to which these preemption determinations are successful, but in the 
process it discarded important Federalism interests without any guaranteed 
benefits to state consumer finance protection law. 
 
A. Judicial Policymaking 
 
For the same reasons that the Supreme Court has turned away from 
judicial “line-drawing of the most arbitrary sort” for defining traditional state 
 
152 Id. at 843–44. 
153 But see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (holding that Skidmore 
deference has continued relevance for agency interpretations in situations where Congress 
has not delegated statutory authority). 
154 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
155 See e.g., Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let's Call Them “Chevron 
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1146 (2012) (declining to 
refer to Skidmore deference as deference at all, but merely “as an element of independent 
judicial judgment”). 
156 Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
157 Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2015). 
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functions immune from federal regulation, Congress should not entrust 
preemption determinations to courts under Skidmore deference.158 
First, Skidmore deference invites judicial policy making on issues of 
immense national importance involving the operation of our national banking 
system. Judges are rarely trained economists, and in the words of Larry 
Kramer, they “lack the resources, know-how, and flexibility to make 
dependable decisions about the level at which to govern in today’s complex 
and rapidly evolving world.”159 Because of this relative lack of economic and 
policy training, it is hard to see how most judges could make informed 
decisions about which state banking laws are worthy of preemption. The 
more likely outcome would be arbitrary judicial line drawing inevitably 
informed by judges’ subconscious policy preferences.160 Delegating 
important questions of consumer finance and banking efficiency to untrained 
judges also destroys the discursive process of federal and state banking 
innovation that has led to so many previously mentioned innovations in our 
financial sector.161 
Skidmore deference as applied to preemption decisions under Section 
1044 is also less democratic. Whatever state of financial regulation that state 
and federal agencies arrive at through the political safeguards of Federalism 
and deliberation at all levels of government should be left as is without 
unelected judges influencing national policy. It also does not necessarily 
follow that entrusting preemption decisions to judges will actually result in 
less harsh forms of preemption. The implicit biases of judges who are hostile 
to states with comprehensive consumer finance protection laws may be more 
likely to preempt state laws, in which case all that the Skidmore provision of 
Section 1044 does is insulate from later judicial review the administrative 
interpretations of judges who reach each preemption question first. 
Additionally, the use of Skidmore deference under Section 1044 will 
ultimately lead to more circuit splits. Because an administrative interpretation 
decided under Skidmore must be decided as a matter of law, “beyond the 
power of the agency to change even through rulemaking,”162 every OCC 
preemption rulemaking regarding consumer finance protection law that 
reaches judicial review is more likely to be decided differently by each 
 
158 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 544 (1985) (deciding that the 
judicial categories of traditional versus untraditional state functions were arbitrary and unworkable). 
159 Kramer, supra note 87, at 1503. 
160 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) 
(“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the 
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on 
the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.”). 
161 See supra Section III.B. 
162 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 249–50 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that Skidmore deference results in courts deciding administrative interpretations as a matter of 
law, which gives them precedential value and prevents amendment by means of rulemaking). 
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federal circuit.163 This means that the effect of Section 1044 on state law will 
differ by circuit across the country until the Supreme Court grants cert to 
resolve all of these questions, as with Madden v. Midland Funding,164 or more 
recently, Lusnak v. Bank of America, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the 
areas of state law the OCC says are presumed to be preempted per 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 7.4008 and 34.4 carry no weight in the judicial determination of 
preemption issues under Dodd-Frank.165 
These circuit splits may become a headache for the OCC and 
nationally chartered banks, but more importantly they divide the country into 
areas in which law applies differently without any of the attending benefits 
that a federalist regime offers. We tolerate states with different laws in order 
to “give[] democracy’s outliers the same opportunities that members of the 
majority routinely enjoy,”166 i.e. their own preferred policies, or to facilitate 
a “national conversation” on divisive subjects through “a variety of local 
ones,”167 or to encourage innovation and experimentation, but circuit splits 
provide none of these benefits in a way that is amenable to our democratic 
process. The banking law that Section 1044’s Skidmore provision will assign 
to each federal circuit will be inevitably random, such that the citizens within 
these circuits will not be invested in the smorgasbord of policy that they end 
up with. And more troublingly, this “ossification”168 of preemption under 
Dodd-Frank means that the OCC will be powerless to change policy in the 
event of systematic financial distress. It is hard to imagine an area of policy 
besides national security that demands more immediate flexibility in times of 
crisis than financial regulation. 
 
B. Federalist Policymaking from the Presidency 
 
In fact, proponents of Federalism in America should embrace 
Chevron for preemption questions with open arms, including in the area of 
banking regulation. This is because the executive branch, which ultimately 
guides agency action, is well suited for the task of resolving federalist 
preemption disputes. As Herbert Wechsler stated, “the prime organ of a . . . 
 
163 Unlike under Chevron deference, in which circuits must only agree that an agency’s 
administrative interpretation is reasonable, under Skidmore, each circuit must independently 
arrive at the same interpretation of a given statute to create a cohesive national policy. 
164 Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015). 
165 See Lusnak v. Bank of Am., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
567 (2018) (“These changes [to preemption per Dodd-Frank] have no bearing here where the 
preemption determination is made by this court and not the OCC.”). 
166 Gerken, supra note 103, at 1898. 
167 Id. at 1896. 
168 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the ossification of agency interpretations made under Skidmore deference after 
judicial review). 
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‘national spirit’ is, of course, the President—both as the Chief Executive and 
as the leader of his party.”169 As Wechsler argued, this position comes from 
the structure of the electoral college, which is largely populated by adding 
the number of seats in the Senate and the House together, resulting in a blend 
of state and purely federal interests.170 In other words, the presidency must 
be won by a federalist coalition of electors. 
 In this respect, the President is a better candidate to resolve questions 
of administrative interpretation in a way which honors the interests of states 
and the national government than an unelected judge, who may err in favor 
of their “personal policy preferences.”171 Additionally, in the words of Elena 
Kagan, “presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public 
to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic 
power.”172 This serves the Federalism interest inherent in democratic 
accountability. By entrusting all OCC preemption choices to the OCC itself, 
as influenced by Presidential policy, Congress could make the respective 
sources of federal and state banking policy clearer to the public. More 
concretely, Justice Kagan has noted that “presidential leadership establishes 
an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the latter's 
responsiveness to the former.”173 This “electoral link” is particularly important 
in order to translate public knowledge of federal versus state policy into actual 
electoral outcomes at the state and federal level in order to make the discursive 
benefits of Federalism real.174 All of this is especially true today given the 
heightened impact that Presidents have on agency policy since the advent of 
Office of Management and Budget regulatory review, which allows 
Presidents to inject themselves into the rulemaking process in order to guide 
agency policy directly at the national level.175 
 
 
 
 
 
169 Wechsler, supra note 117, at 552. 
170 Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (affording representation in the electoral college to the 
District of Columbia). Ultimately the District’s representation is not significant enough to 
undermine the Federalist character of the electoral college, which is undeniably more 
representative of state and national policy preferences than the unelected judiciary. Wechsler, 
supra note 117, at 552. 
171 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
172 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001). 
173 Id. at 2332. 
174 Id. 
175 See Summary of Executive Order 12866 – Regulatory Planning and Review, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-exec 
utive-order-12866-regulatory-planning-and-review [https://perma.cc/EWV2-Y2X9] (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2020) (providing an overview of EO 12866 and 13563 and the OMB review process). 
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C. Traditional Preemption Principles Protect against Undue Preemption 
 
Section 1044’s Skidmore command is also unnecessary because 
traditional preemption principles are sufficient to guard against unwarranted 
intrusions into state law. While some scholars “have argued that granting 
Chevron deference to agency interpretations regarding preemption is 
inappropriate” because it would put Federalism questions in the hands of 
unelected agency officials,176 there is little constitutional muster in this 
sentiment. The Supremacy Clause clearly states that “[t]his Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”177 When Congress leaves “a gap for 
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”178 In other words, 
a regulation promulgated by an administrative agency within the reasonable 
bounds of a delegation of authority from Congress really is law for purposes 
of the Supremacy Clause. Chevron deference is more than an interpretive 
rule, it is a recognition that Congress makes certain laws which it “entrusted” 
agencies “to administer.”179 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to 
outright endorse Chevron deference in preemption determinations by federal 
agencies, sometimes being “quite deferential” and other times being “almost 
entirely nondeferential.”180 Most recently, in Coventry Health Care of Missouri, 
Inc. v. Nevils, the Supreme Court once again sidestepped the question.181 
 The constitutional basis of Chevron deference is a Congressional 
delegation of authority, and in a preemption context, courts are more than 
capable of determining where an agency exceeded the reasonable bounds of 
a Congressional delegation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. is a good 
 
176 Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 740–41 (2004) 
(citing Jack W. Campbell IV, Regulatory Preemption in the Garcia/Chevron Era, 59 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 805, 832 (1998); Damien Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in 
Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 278 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331 (2000)). 
177 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
178 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
179 Id. at 844. 
180 See Gregory M. Dickinson, Calibrating Chevron for Preemption, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 667, 
668, 668 n.1 (2011) (noting the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, citing 
in particular Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328–32 (2008) and Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2007)). Watters is a particularly good example for the purposes of 
this comment, as the Supreme Court declined to state what level of deference was appropriate 
for the OCC’s determination that state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks can 
be regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency rather than by the agencies of 
states in which those subsidiaries are located. Id. 
181 See Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils, 137 S. Ct. 1190, 1198 n.3 (2017) 
(“Because the statute alone resolves this dispute, we need not consider whether Chevron 
deference attaches to OPM's 2015 rule.”). 
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example of this kind of interpretive framework, although it was a pre-Chevron 
holding.182 In Rice, the Supreme Court held that because in regulating warehouse 
licenses, Congress had entered a “field which the States have traditionally 
occupied,” it would begin its preemption analysis “with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”183 
In effect, this kind of interpretive clear statement rule could inform 
Chevron analysis as applied to the preemption of state consumer financial 
protection laws, perhaps narrowing the range of preemptive interpretations 
that the OCC could argue were reasonable given the history and purpose of 
the National Banking Act. This recognition that Congress does not generally 
intend to supplant state law would hedge against wanton preemption while 
honoring the foundation of Chevron deference, which is Congress’s intent 
with respect to a statute’s meaning. 
At the very least, a more comprehensive and consistent national 
banking system would follow. And most importantly, those who object to 
OCC preemption rulemakings could always petition Congress to make new 
law affecting nationally chartered banks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Section 1044 represents a bold statement of Congressional preference 
for more consumer finance regulation following the 2008 financial crisis. By 
curtailing the power of federal banking agencies like the Office of the 
Comptroller to preempt state banking laws, Dodd-Frank sought to leave more 
of these laws in place to guard against the imprudent consumer lending that 
was thought to have contributed to the crisis.184 Regardless of whether you 
believe more consumer protection laws would improve the financial stability 
of our banking system or not, this paper has argued that any banking reforms 
should be made within the confines of our Dual Banking system to secure 
important Federalism benefits. Ultimately this means that if more consumer 
protection is warranted for lending performed by national banks, it should 
come from federal law, not state regulators. 
In order to secure Federalism values such as democratic 
accountability, policy innovation, and political transparency, our Dual 
Banking regime must be protected through preemption of state banking 
regulations for nationally chartered banks under deferential Chevron review. 
 
182 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
183 Id. at 230. 
184 See generally John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis: 2007–2010, FED. RSRV. HIST. 
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis 
[https://perma.cc/YP3H-BNES] (discussing the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, which is 
generally thought to have caused the 2008 recession). 
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Section 1044 undermines these interests to little or no benefit to consumer 
protection given the historical success of banks in securing protective federal 
policy, integrating their supervisory regulators with the Federal supervision 
system, and partnering with federal consumer finance protection agencies. 
Where these measures fail, states can still rely on the residual local 
attractiveness of their charters to entice banks to operate under their 
regulatory purview, as well as the interpretive canons that inform Chevron 
review in the federal court system. 
The ultimate proof of concept for this model of regulation lies within 
Dodd-Frank itself in the establishment of the Consumer Finance Protection 
Bureau, which has the power to issue substantive rulemakings to prohibit 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices related to mortgages, credit 
cards, and other forms of consumer finance.185 Covered persons under the 
CFPB’s broad regulatory jurisdiction include any entities and their service 
providers who offer or provide any “consumer financial product or service,” 
with few carve outs.186 Importantly, the CFPB not only has rulemaking 
authority, but also enforcement power and even supervisory authority over 
banks and non-bank institutions.187 And while its leadership structure may 
have been struck down this year, the CFPB’s mandate continues with the 
Supreme Court’s blessing as living proof that Congress can act aggressively 
to regulate national banks and their lending practices directly.188 Instead of 
abandoning our Dual Banking system, future consumer finance protection 
reform should follow in the CFPB’s footsteps by ensuring that national banks 
play by federal rules. In the words of now Senator Warren, “[t]he problem is 
not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of federal law to offer a 
suitable alternative to the preempted state law.”189 
 
 
 
185 See Jean Eaglesham, Warning Shot on Financial Protection, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 9, 2011, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703507804576130370862263258 
[https://perma.cc/RA72-YP2H] (discussing the enforcement activities then-director Richard 
Cordray planned within the CFPB’s jurisdiction). For a comprehensive list of the CFPB’s 
authorities, consult 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531–5538. 
186 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5517 (describing classes of persons and entities 
over whom the CFPB does not have power).   
187 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C). For an analysis of the CFPB’s uniquely extensive regulatory 
powers, and a comparison with the FTC’s jurisdiction, see generally Joseph L. Barloon, 
Darren M. Welch & Neepa K. Mehta, “Leveling the Playing Field”: Implications of CFPB 
Authority over Non-Depository Financial Institutions, 27 ANTITRUST 71 (2013). 
188 See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2209 (2020) (“The 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act bearing on the CFPB’s structure and duties remain fully 
operative without the offending tenure restriction.”). 
189 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 47, at 83. 
